Managerial Agency Costs of Socialistic Internal Capital Markets: Empirical Evidence from China
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Theory of Socialistic Internal Capital Markets
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0954-1314
DOI: 10.1111/jifm.12014