Managerial Discretion and Expense Preference Behavior
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Review of Economics and Statistics
سال: 1985
ISSN: 0034-6535
DOI: 10.2307/1924721