Managerial Empowerment and Firm Risk-Taking

Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking

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Firm Size as a Moderator between Corporate Governance and Risk-Taking in Malaysian Banks

This study investigates the moderating effect of firm size in the relationship between corporate governance (board size, board independence and ownership concentration) and banks’ risk-taking (insolvency risk and credit risk). Secondary data (annual reports) was collected from a sample of 21 Malaysian commercial banks covering the 2005–2014 accounting period. An empirical model using pooled ord...

Fund Flows, Performance, Managerial Career Concerns, and Risk Taking

We develop a framework in which we simultaneously model the interactions among investors, fund companies (represented by fund advisors), and managers. In this framework, we show that the interplay between a manager's incentives arising from her compensation structure and career concerns leads to a non-monotonic (approximately U-shaped) relation between her risk choices and prior performance rel...

Appendix for “ Managerial risk - taking incentives and corporate pension policy ”

Managerial Style and Firm Value

This study analyzes the effect of managerial style on firm value by partitioning general and administrative (G&A) expenses in the REIT industry into a nondiscretionary “structural” component associated with the costs of asset and liability management and a discretionary or “style” component. The discretionary component is significantly related to at least one measure of stylespecifically, the p...