Managerial Risk Taking

Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking

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Fund Flows, Performance, Managerial Career Concerns, and Risk Taking

We develop a framework in which we simultaneously model the interactions among investors, fund companies (represented by fund advisors), and managers. In this framework, we show that the interplay between a manager's incentives arising from her compensation structure and career concerns leads to a non-monotonic (approximately U-shaped) relation between her risk choices and prior performance rel...

Appendix for “ Managerial risk - taking incentives and corporate pension policy ”

Managerial Overconfidence and Bank Risk Taking: A Cross-Country Analysis

This paper examines the effects of managerial overconfidence on bank risk taking and investigates whether improvements in governance can help to mitigate the adverse effects of managerial overconfidence on bank risk taking by using ordinary least squares method. The sample consists of the financial institutions in G20 and Taiwan over the period of 2005-2012. The executive overconfidence is meas...

Managerial Risk-Taking Behavior and Equity-Based Compensation

I study managers' risk-taking behavior and how it is affected by equity-based compensation. I find that in response to an exogenous increase in takeover protection in Delaware during the mid-1990s, managers lower firm risk by 5%. I also find that the decrease in firm risk is concentrated among firms with low managerial equity-based incentives. In particular, firms with low CEO portfolio sensiti...