Manipulation of Preferences and Relative Utilitarianism
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Manipulation of Preferences and Relative Utilitarianism
Given n agents with who wish to divide m commodities, consider the n-person noncooperative game with strategies consisting of concave increasing utility functions, and whose outcomes are the relative utilitarian solution. Any constrained equal-income competitive equilibrium allocation for the true utilities is shown to ba a Nash equilibrium outcome for the noncooperative game. Conditions are pr...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1006/game.2000.0839