Manipulation through Bribes
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Manipulation through Bribes
We consider allocation rules that choose both an outcome and transfers, based on the agents’ reported valuations of the outcomes. Under a given allocation rule, a bribing situation exists when agent j could pay agent i to misreport his valuations, resulting in a net gain to both agents. A rule is bribe-proof if such opportunities never arise. The central result is that when a bribe-proof rule i...
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When faced with a regulatory constraint, firms can either comply, bribe the regulator to get around the rule, or lobby the government to relax it. We analyze this choice, and its consequences, in a simple dynamic model. In equilibrium, when the level of development is low, firms are more inclined to bend the rule through bribery but they tend to switch to lobbying when the level of development ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2000
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2618