Many-valued logic and sequence arguments in value theory

Abstract Some find it plausible that a sufficiently long duration of torture is worse than any mild headaches. Similarly, has been claimed million humans living great lives better number worm-like creatures feeling few seconds pleasure each. have related bad things to good along the same lines. For example, one may hold future in which sufficient beings experience lifetime bad, regardless what else contains, while minor things, such as slight unpleasantness, can always be counterbalanced by enough things. Among most common objections ideas are sequence arguments. But arguments usually formulated classical logic. One might therefore wonder if they work we instead adopt many-valued I show that, logical framework, answer depends on versions transitivity used premises. We get valid grant several strong forms ‘is at least as’ and notion completeness. Other, weaker lead invalid The plausibility premises largely set aside here, but tentatively note almost all seem intuitively problematic. Still, moderately acceptable arguments, although statements initial value claims avoid these some extent.