Market Good Flexibility in Capacity Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Production and Operations Management
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1059-1478
DOI: 10.1111/j.1937-5956.2012.01355.x