Market-oriented interest rate, deposit insurance system and bank runs
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Deposit Insurance , Institutions and Bank Interest Rates
Many recent institutional reforms of the financial system have relied on the introduction of an explicit scheme of Deposit Insurance. This instrument aims at two main targets, contributing to systemic stability and protecting depositors. However it may also affect the interest rate spread in the banking system, which can be viewed as an indicator of market power in this financial segment. This ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: China Political Economy
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2516-1652
DOI: 10.1108/cpe-04-2019-0004