Market structure and matching with contracts
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Market structure and matching with contracts
Ostrovsky (2008) [9] develops a theory of stability for a model of matching in exogenously given networks. For this model a generalization of pairwise stability, chain stability, can always be satisfied as long as agents’ preferences satisfy same side substitutability and cross side complementarity. Given this preference domain I analyze the interplay between properties of the network structure...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2010.04.001