Market structure, common ownership, and coordinated manager compensation

Optimal Managerial Compensation, Earnings Manipulation, and Manager Ownership by

The optimal management contract is derived in an environment in which a manager can influence the distribution of earnings through an unobservable effort decision, only the manager observes actual earnings, and the manager can engage in costly reported earnings manipulation. The manager's compensation is required to satisfy an ex ante participation constraint that reflects the cost of effort an...

Insurer Ownership Structure and Executive Compensation as Strategic Complements

We examine theories of insurance companies’ choices of ownership structure and executive compensation, focusing on the impact of a firm’s lines of business in determining these policy choices. Using results on strategic complementarities, we identify the requirements for the theory to have testable implications for reduced-form regression coefficients. Obtaining testable implications for struct...

Insurer Ownership Structure and Executive Compensation as Complements

The authors apply results on complementarities to theories of insurance companies’ choices of ownership structure and executive compensation. They identify minimal restrictions on the interaction between firm policies and exogenous characteristics for theories to have testable implications for reduced-form regression coefficients. Obtaining testable implications for structural-equation regressi...

Portfolio Manager Ownership and Fund Performance:

This paper documents the range of portfolio manager ownership in the funds they manage and examines whether higher ownership is associated with improved future performance. Almost half of all managers have ownership stakes in their funds, though the absolute investment is modest. Future risk-adjusted performance is positively related to managerial ownership, with performance improving by about ...

Market Structure and Price Adjustment in the Iranian Tea Market