Martha Kneale on Why Metaphysical Necessities Are Not A Priori
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Conceptual Truths, Strong Possibilities and Our Knowledge of Metaphysical Necessities
I argue that there is a reliable epistemic route from knowledge of conceptual truths to knowledge of metaphysical necessities. In a first step, I argue that we possess knowledge of conceptual truths since we know what (many of) our terms apply to. I bolster this line of thought with a rebuttal of Williamson’s recent argument against epistemic analyticity. In a second step, I argue that our know...
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Object−oriented programming hasn't created a viable software component industry. From a technical perspective, the reason for this failure lies in an insufficient consideration of the unique requirements of component software. Object−oriented programming too often concentrates on individual objects, instead of whole collections of objects, i.e., components. Component−oriented programming requir...
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In recent years, there has been a flurry of work on the metaphysics of race. While it is now widely accepted that races do not share robust, biobehavioral essences, opinions differ over what, if anything, race is. Recent work has been divided between three apparently quite different answers. A variety of theorists argue for racial skepticism, the view that races do not exist at all. A second gr...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of the American Philosophical Association
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2053-4477,2053-4485
DOI: 10.1017/apa.2018.56