Matching Patterns When Group Size Exceeds Two
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چکیده
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Matching Patterns when Group Size Exceeds Two
Matching under transferable utility is well understood when groups of fixed size n = 2 are being formed: Complementarity or substitutability of types in the group payoff function pins down the matching pattern, whatever the distribution of types or specifics of the payoff function. But little is known about one-sided matching in the case of groups with fixed size n > 2. This subject is taken up...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
سال: 2017
ISSN: 1945-7669,1945-7685
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150080