Matching with Contracts: An Efficient Marriage Market?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Market structure and matching with contracts
Ostrovsky (2008) [9] develops a theory of stability for a model of matching in exogenously given networks. For this model a generalization of pairwise stability, chain stability, can always be satisfied as long as agents’ preferences satisfy same side substitutability and cross side complementarity. Given this preference domain I analyze the interplay between properties of the network structure...
متن کاملBidimensional Matching with Heterogeneous Preferences: Smoking in the Marriage Market
We develop a bidimensional frictionless matching model under transferable utility, where individuals are characterized by a continuous trait (e.g., socioeconomic status) and a binary attribute (e.g., smoking status). The model is truly multidimensional as it incorporates attributes for which there are heterogeneous preferences in the population regarding their desirability, that is, the impac...
متن کاملSpousal Matching, Marriage Contracts and Property Division in Divorce
We develop a collective household model with spousal matching in which there exists marital gains to assortative matching and marriage quality for each couple is revealed ex post. Marriages, intra-marital allocations and divorce are all determined endogenously. Changes in the laws that regulate property division in divorce affect existing couples and couples-to-be differently. For existing coup...
متن کاملMatching with Contracts
We develop a model of matching with contracts which incorporates, as special cases, the college admissions problem, the Kelso-Crawford labor market matching model, and ascending package auctions. We introduce a new “law of aggregate demand” for the case of discrete heterogeneous workers and show that, when workers are substitutes, this law is satisfied by profit-maximizing firms. When workers a...
متن کاملFatter attraction: anthropometric and socioeconomic matching on the marriage market
We construct a marriage market model of matching along multiple dimensions, some of which unobservable, where individual preferences can be summarized by a one-dimensional index combining the various characteristics. We show that, under testable assumptions, these indices are ordinally identi ed, and that the male and female trade-o¤s between their partnerscharacteristics are overidenti ed. Us...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2179055