Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Matching with preferences over colleagues solves classical matching
In this note, we demonstrate that the problem of “many-to-one matching with (strict) preferences over colleagues” is actually more difficult than the classical many-to-one matching problem, “matching without preferences over colleagues.” We give an explicit reduction of any problem of the latter type to a problem of the former type. This construction leads to the first algorithm which finds all...
متن کاملContracts vs. preferences over colleagues in matching
Francis Flanagan Wake Forest University Abstract I introduce a general many-to-one matching framework which includes the matching with contracts model as well as models of matching with preferences over colleagues as special cases. I show that this general model can be embedded into the model with contracts, thus the models are equivalent, and all results from the many-to-one matching with pref...
متن کاملA solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty, without strong assumptions on agents’ preferences. We introduce a method that finds all core matchings, if any exist. The method requires no assumptions on prefere...
متن کاملMarriage Matching with Correlated Preferences
Authors of experimental, empirical, theoretical and computational studies of two-sided matching markets have recognized the importance of correlated preferences. We develop a general method for the study of the effect of correlation of preferences on the outcomes generated by two-sided matching mechanisms. We then illustrate our method by using it to quantify the effect of correlation of prefer...
متن کاملStable Matching with Evolving Preferences
We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time step, the preference list of some player may change by swapping random adjacent members. The goal of a central agency (algorithm) is to maintain an approximately stable matching (in terms of number of blocking pairs) at all times. The changes in the preference lists are not reported to the algorithm, but must...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.09.011