منابع مشابه
On Truthful Mechanisms for Maximin Share Allocations
We study a fair division problem with indivisible items, namely the computation of maximin share allocations. Given a set of n players, the maximin share of a single player is the best she can guarantee to herself, if she would partition the items in any way she prefers, into n bundles, and then receive her least desirable bundle. The objective then is to find an allocation, so that each player...
متن کاملApproximate Maximin Share Allocations in Matroids
The maximin share guarantee is, in the context of allocating indivisible goods to a set of agents, a recent fairness criterion. A solution achieving a constant approximation of this guarantee always exists and can be computed in polynomial time. We extend the problem to the case where the goods collectively received by the agents satisfy a matroidal constraint. Polynomial approximation algorith...
متن کاملExplicit Collusion and Market Share Allocations
We show that explicit cartels can implement market share allocations using a reporting framework that is considered to be legally acceptable for trade associations. This simple resolution of the market share cartels monitoring problem provides an explanation for the apparent prevalence of market share allocations relative to customer or geographic allocations by explicit cartels. Keywords: exp...
متن کاملWhen Can the Maximin Share Guarantee Be Guaranteed?
The fairness notion of maximin share (MMS) guarantee underlies a deployed algorithm for allocating indivisible goods under additive valuations. Our goal is to understand when we can expect to be able to give each player his MMS guarantee. Previous work has shown that such an MMS allocation may not exist, but the counterexample requires a number of goods that is exponential in the number of play...
متن کاملDouble implementation of linear cost share equilibrium allocations
In this paper we consider the problem of double implementation of Linear Cost Share Equilibrium (LCSE) allocations by a feasible and continuous mechanism whose Nash allocations and strong Nash allocations coincide with Linear Cost Share Equilibrium allocations. The mechanism presented here allows preferences and initial endowments as well as coalition patterns to be privately observed, a featur...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1076-9757
DOI: 10.1613/jair.1.11702