May Belief Outstrip Evidence?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Evidence and Belief
We discuss the representation of knowledge and of belief from the viewpoint of decision theory. While the Bayesian approach enjoys general-purpose applicability and axiomatic foundations, it suffers from several drawbacks. In particular, it does not model the belief formation process, and does not relate beliefs to evidence. We survey alternative approaches, and focus on formal model of casebas...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The International Journal of Ethics
سال: 1916
ISSN: 1526-422X
DOI: 10.1086/intejethi.26.3.2377054