Mean Field Games and systemic risk
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Mean Field Games and Systemic Risk
We propose a simple model of inter-bank borrowing and lending where the evolution of the logmonetary reserves of N banks is described by a system of diffusion processes coupled through their drifts in such a way that stability of the system depends on the rate of inter-bank borrowing and lending. Systemic risk is characterized by a large number of banks reaching a default threshold by a given t...
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In this paper, we study a class of risk-sensitive mean-field stochastic differential games. Under regularity assumptions, we use results from standard risk-sensitive differential game theory to show that the mean-field value of the exponentiated cost functional coincides with the value function of a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Fleming (HJBF) equation with an additional quadratic term. We provide an...
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We survey here some recent studies concerning what we call mean-field models by analogy with Statistical Mechanics and Physics. More precisely, we present three examples of our mean-field approach to modelling in Economics and Finance (or other related subjects. . . ). Roughly speaking, we are concerned with situations that involve a very large number of “rational players” with a limited inform...
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In this paper we study a mean field model for discrete time, finite number of states, dynamic games. These models arise in situations that involve a very large number of agents moving from state to state according to certain optimality criteria. The mean field approach for optimal control and differential games (continuous state and time) was introduced by Lasry and Lions [LL06a, LL06b, LL07]. ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Communications in Mathematical Sciences
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1539-6746,1945-0796
DOI: 10.4310/cms.2015.v13.n4.a4