Mechanism Design for Multi-Type Housing Markets with Acceptable Bundles
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Mechanism Design for Multi-Type Housing Markets
We study multi-type housing markets, where there are p ≥ 2 types of items, each agent is initially endowed one item of each type, and the goal is to design mechanisms without monetary transfer to (re)allocate items to the agents based on their preferences over bundles of items, such that each agent gets one item of each type. In sharp contrast to classical housing markets, previous studies in m...
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The (Shapley-Scarf) housing market is a well-studied and fundamental model of an exchange economy. Each agent owns a single house and the goal is to reallocate the houses to the agents in a mutually beneficial and stable manner. Recently, Alcalde-Unzu and Molis (2011) and Jaramillo and Manjunath (2011) independently examined housing markets in which agents can express indifferences among houses...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2374-3468,2159-5399
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33012165