Mechanism Design under Collusion and Uniform Transfers
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Continuity in Mechanism Design without Transfers
We adopt a mechanism design approach to model communication between a principal and a privately informed agent in the context where monetary incentives are not available. We provide a simple condition on the distribution of the agent’s type which ensures that the optimal mechanism is continuous. With strict log-concavity of the distribution, there exists a unique optimal mechanism that is chara...
متن کاملDynamic Mechanism Design Without Transfers: Promises and Confidentiality
This paper considers mechanisms for truthful revelation in a dynamic setting where each agent privately observes the expected value of his option, only a single option can be selected each period, and each agent receives a payoff that depends on the type of the selected option. To incentivize the agents to report their private information honestly, the principal trades off a higher likelihood o...
متن کاملSeparability and decomposition in mechanism design with transfers
In private values quasi-linear environment, we consider problems where allocation decisions along multiple components have to be made. Every agent has additively separable valuation over the components. We show that every neutral and dominant strategy implementable allocation rule in this problem is a neutral component affine maximizer, which assigns non-negative weight vectors to agents in eac...
متن کاملSustaining Collusion under Economic Integration
In this paper, we aim at investigating from a game theory perspective whether trade liberalization can promote a collusive intra-industry trade and whether such a collusive trade is always socially desirable compared to the autarchy solution. We show that, under Cournot competition, economic integration is anti-competitive if collusive trade is a possible outcome of the repeated game; under pri...
متن کاملA3-Codes under Collusion Attacks
An A-code is an extension of A-code in which none of the three participants, transmitter, receiver and arbiter, is assumed trusted. In this paper we extend the previous model of A-codes by allowing transmitter and receiver not only to individually attack the system but also collude with the arbiter against the other. We derive informationtheoretic lower bounds on success probability of various ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economic Theory
سال: 2005
ISSN: 1097-3923,1467-9779
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2005.00238.x