Mechanisms for Repeated Trade
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Mechanisms for Repeated Trade∗
How does the feasibility of efficient dynamic contracting in repeated trade depend on the features of the bargaining environment such as persistence of values, the agent’s private information about the evolution of uncertainty, or trading frequency? To answer this question, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for efficient, unsubsidized, and individually rational trade in environment...
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How does the feasibility of efficient dynamic contracting in repeated trade depend on the features of the bargaining environment such as persistence of values, the agent’s private information about the evolution of uncertainty, or trading frequency? To answer this question, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for efficient, unsubsidized, and individually rational trade in environment...
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We analyze the extent to which efficient trade is possible in an ongoing relationship between impatient agents with hidden valuations (i.i.d. over time), restricting attention to equilibria that satisfy ex post incentive constraints in each period. With ex ante budget balance, efficient trade can be supported in each period if the discount factor is at least one half. In contrast, when the budg...
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We study the design of mechanisms in combinatorial auction domains. We focus on settings where the auction is repeated, motivated by auctions for licenses or advertising space. We consider models of agent behaviour in which they either apply common learning techniques to minimize the regret of their bidding strategies, or apply short-sighted best-response strategies. We ask: when can a black-bo...
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There are two sources of inefficiency of strategic equilibria (SE) in market mechanisms. The first is the oligopolistic effect, which occurs when an agent can single-handedly influence prices. With a continuum of agents we get ‘perfect competition’ and this effect is, of course, wiped out. But the inefficiency of SEs may nevertheless persist because agents are not ‘perfectly liquid’, i.e., the ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1945-7669,1945-7685
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20140173