Mental representations are not necessary for fish consciousness
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Animal Sentience
سال: 2017
ISSN: 2377-7478
DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1243