Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
A Defense of Temperate Epistemic Transparency
Epistemic transparency tells us that, if an agent S knows a given proposition p, then S knows that she knows that p. This idea is usually encoded in the socalled KK principle of epistemic logic. The paper develops an argument in favor of a moderate version of KK, which I dub quasi-transparency, as a normative rather than a descriptive principle. In the second Section I put forward the suggestio...
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The Reflexive-Intentional Model of the Subject (RIMS) connects the subject’s bipolar probabilistic behavior with its mental domain. We demonstrate that the Matching Law is a formal consequence of this tie. RIMS allows us also to deduce theoretically the main patterns of animal behavior in the experiments with two alternatives where the Matching Law reveals itself. This finding inclines us to pu...
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The target paper’s main point is that mentalism and, to this extent, mentalistic (e.g., cognitive) psychology can only be materialistic and, hence, cannot be dualistic. The commentaries to the paper are insightful and stimulating. A few call for corrections, the rest for further clarification. Most criticize the mind-brain identity theory. This criticism is beside the point, as I did not intend...
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J. C. Wakefield's (1998) critique of W. C. Follette and A. C. Houts's (1996) article is addressed by raising questions about (a) mentalism as a framework for studying psychopathology, (b) the nature of inferred mechanisms and the process of making such inferences, and (c) the accuracy of claiming that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM; American Psychiatric Associati...
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If I were to believe you are trustworthy just on your say-so, my reasoning would be infected with what is called epistemic circularity. I would be supposing a source is trustworthy by relying on that very source. Generally speaking, we tend to think this is a very bad idea. It is why we don’t bother asking politicians or salesmen whether they are honest. A well-known line of reasoning stemming ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Australasian Journal of Philosophy
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0004-8402,1471-6828
DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2011.627925