Merger Externalities in Oligopolistic Markets
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Merger Appraisal in Oligopolistic Markets
PREFACE This paper is the 19th of a series of research papers (listed overleaf) to be published by the Office of Fair Trading. These papers report the findings of projects commissioned by the OFT as part of its ongoing programme of research into aspects of UK Competition and Consumer Policy. The intention is that research findings should be made available to a wider audience of practitioners, b...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2292106