Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results
Allocation rules for cooperative games can be manipulated by coalitions merging into single players, or, conversely, players splitting into a number of smaller units. This paper collects some (im)possibility results on mergingand splitting-proofness of (core) allocation rules for cooperative games with side-payments. JEL classification: C71, D23, D71.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0337-7