Meta-Rationality in Normal Form Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Computers Communications & Control
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1841-9836,1841-9836
DOI: 10.15837/ijccc.2010.5.2225