Microcredit games with noisy signals: Contagion and free-riding
نویسندگان
چکیده
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of the Japanese and International Economies
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0889-1583
DOI: 10.1016/j.jjie.2013.12.006