Migrant smuggling when exploitation is private information

An Annotated Bibliography Migrant Smuggling in Asia

When Less Information is Good for E¢ ciency: Private Information in Bilateral Trade and in Markets

We consider a simple bilateral trading game between a seller and a buyer who have private valuations for an indivisible good. The seller makes a price o¤er which the buyer can either accept or reject. If the seller can observe the valuation of the buyer (if information is symmetric), then the trading outcome is trivially e¢ cient. If the seller can not observe the valuation (if information is a...

When every $P$-flat ideal is flat

In this paper‎, ‎we study the class of rings in which every $P$-flat‎ ‎ideal is flat and which will be called $PFF$-rings‎. ‎In particular‎, ‎Von Neumann regular rings‎, ‎hereditary rings‎, ‎semi-hereditary ring‎, ‎PID and arithmetical rings are examples of $PFF$-rings‎. ‎In the context domain‎, ‎this notion coincide with‎ ‎Pr"{u}fer domain‎. ‎We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for‎...

Competition and confidentiality: Signaling quality in a duopoly when there is universal private information

How does the need to signal quality through price affect equilibrium pricing and profits, when a firm faces a similarly-situated rival? In this paper, we provide a model of non-cooperative signaling by two firms that compete over a continuum of consumers. We assume “universal incomplete information;” that is, each market participant has some private information: each consumer has private inform...

Rules and Standards When Compliance Costs Are Private Information

A regulator, seeking to maximize net benefits, must choose between rules and standards and then set a level of care. The regulated agents have private information about their compliance costs. Rules are set ex ante, so agents know the required level of care. Standards are established after agents have taken initial actions, in anticipation of the regulating bureau’s directive. Those actions all...