“Migration and sovereign default risk” a comment
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Sovereign Credit Risk with Endogenous Default
This paper provides a model of sovereign default risk pricing, in which a sovereign country endogenously determines the timing of default on its external debt. The theoretical relationships between credit risk and the macro-variables considered in the model are consistent with the empirical literature. The model also helps to explain the variation across time in Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI...
متن کاملSovereign Default Risk and Banks in a Monetary Union
This paper seeks to understand the interplay between banks, bank regulation, sovereign default risk and central bank guarantees in a monetary union. I assume that banks can use sovereign bonds for repurchase agreements with a common central bank, and that their sovereign partially backs up any losses, should the banks not be able to repurchase the bonds. I argue that regulators in risky countri...
متن کاملPredicting Sovereign Default
With the financial crises ongoing in Greece and Venezuela, sovereign debt crises have become more and more prominent in the public eye. Thus, it has become important to be able to predict when nations will enter such debt crises. We collected publicly available data in order to train models to predict, given a nation’s economic status in one year, whether they would be in a debt crisis the next...
متن کاملOptimal sovereign default
When is it optimal for a government to default on its legal repayment obligations? We answer this question for a small open economy with domestic production risk in which contracting frictions make it optimal for the government to finance itself by issuing non-contingent debt. We show that Ramsey optimal policies occasionally deviate from the legal repayment obligation and repay debt only parti...
متن کاملSovereign default risk, the IMF and creditor moral hazard
The IMF potentially creates moral hazard when it provides bailouts to countries in a financial crisis. We ask whether a creditor moral hazard is observable in the data. We test the hypothesis that recent unprecedented bailouts – starting with the 1994 Mexican crisis – changed international investors’ perception of default risk on international borrowing. Our events-study approach identifies imp...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Monetary Economics
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0304-3932
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2020.04.011