Mimicking insider trades

Corporate Governance and the Information Content of Insider Trades

Most corporate governance research focuses on the behavior of chief executive officers, board members, institutional shareholders, and other similar parties. Little research focuses on the impact of executives whose primary responsibility is to enforce and shape corporate governance inside the firm. This study examines the role of the general counsel (GC) in mitigating informed trading by corpo...

Political Connections and the Informativeness of Insider Trades

This paper examines the relation between political connections and informed trading by corporate insiders in the context of government intervention during the Financial Crisis. Consistent with politically connected insiders extracting rents from shareholders, we find strong evidence of a relation between political connections and informed trading by corporate insiders. We find that the relation...

Is there Information Content in Insider Trades in the Singapore Exchange?

Over the past decade, numerous studies have debated the usefulness of insider trading. One particularly important study relates to the informational role that insiders’ transaction volumes have on trading activity in the equity market. In our paper, we examine whether insiders’ purchases (sales) indicate positive (negative) earnings announcements. We argue that if insiders have early access to ...

Market Efficiency Reloaded: Why Insider Trades do not Reveal Exploitable Information

Insider trading studies related to the German market have emphasized that outside investors may earn excess returns by mimicking the transactions of corporate directors. Such a result, provided that it holds, would constitute a serious violation of the efficient market hypothesis. The results presented in this paper, though, show that this anomaly is mainly caused by a subset of stocks with hig...

4-homogeneous Latin Trades