Min-max certainty equivalence principle and differential games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Min-Max Certainty Equivalence Principle and Differential Games
This paper presents a version of the Certainty Equivalence Principle, usable for nonlinear, variable end-time, partial observation Zero-Sum Differential Games, which states that under the unicity of the solution to the auxiliary problem, optimal controllers can be derived from the solution of the related perfect observation game. An example is provided where in one region, the new extended resu...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Robust and Nonlinear Control
سال: 1996
ISSN: 1049-8923,1099-1239
DOI: 10.1002/(sici)1099-1239(199610)6:8<825::aid-rnc193>3.0.co;2-s