Minority games, evolving capitals and replicator dynamics
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Minority games, evolving capitals and replicator dynamics
We discuss a simple version of the Minority Game (MG) in which agents hold only one strategy each, but in which their capitals evolve dynamically according to their success and in which the total trading volume varies in time accordingly. This feature is known to be crucial for MGs to reproduce stylised facts of real market data. The stationary states and phase diagram of the model can be compu...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1742-5468
DOI: 10.1088/1742-5468/2009/11/p11012