Model and Program Repair via SAT Solving
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Parallel SAT Solving in Bounded Model Checking
Bounded model checking (BMC) is an incremental refutation technique to search for counterexamples of increasing length. The existence of a counterexample of a fixed length is expressed by a first-order logic formula that is checked for satisfiability using a suitable solver. We apply communicating parallel solvers to check satisfiability of the BMC formulae. In contrast to other parallel solvin...
متن کاملFinding strategyproof social choice functions via SAT solving
G./Endriss, 2011: Automated theorem search (through a universal reduction step) for ranking sets of objects B./G./Seedig, 2014: Finding preference profiles for k-majority digraphs G., 2014: Finding preference profiles of given Condorcet dimension • In this paper Method: more evolved technique to also treat strategyproofness for irresolute social choice functions Results: e.g., efficiency and st...
متن کاملOptimal Bounds for the No-Show Paradox via SAT Solving
Voting rules allow multiple agents to aggregate their preferences in order to reach joint decisions. Perhaps one of the most important desirable properties in this context is Condorcet-consistency, which requires that a voting rule should return an alternative that is preferred to any other alternative by some majority of voters. Another desirable property is participation, which requires that ...
متن کاملSolving d-SAT via Backdoors to Small Treewidth
A backdoor set of a CNF formula is a set of variables such that fixing the truth values of the variables from this set moves the formula into a polynomial-time decidable class. In this work we obtain several algorithmic results for solving d-SAT, by exploiting backdoors to d-CNF formulas whose incidence graphs have small treewidth. For a CNF formula φ and integer t, a strong backdoor set to tre...
متن کاملVoting with Ties: Strong Impossibilities via SAT Solving
Voting rules allow groups of agents to aggregate their preferences in order to reach joint decisions. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, a seminal result in social choice theory, implies that, when agents have strict preferences, all anonymous, Pareto-optimal, and single-valued voting rules can be strategically manipulated. In this paper, we consider multi-agent voting when there can be ties in...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1539-9087,1558-3465
DOI: 10.1145/3147426