Modeling tax evasion with genetic algorithms
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
value added tax and tax evasion
The phenomenon of tax evasion has been always one of the most major issues among economists due to it's devastating effects on the economy and the process of economic development. Many scholars have always sought to provide solutions to reduce and limit tax evasion. The introduction of the VAT system can be seen as a milestone in the area of economic transparency and tax evasion, which refers t...
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Taxes make up the bulk of any government revenue and provide a sustainable source of revenue. In recent years, the main focus of the tax reform program, in almost all countries of the world, has been on VAT. But a major problem in the effective implementation of VAT, which is a nascent tax base in countries, is the phenomenon of tax evasion. Therefore, one of the most basic steps in preventing ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics of Governance
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1435-6104,1435-8131
DOI: 10.1007/s10101-014-0152-7