Models of Financing of Natural Monopolies: Budget, Corporate and Project Financing
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Corporate Investment and Financing Dynamics∗
This paper studies the behavior of leverage ratios in a dynamic trade-off model with real frictions. Firms underutilize debt when financing investment to retain financial flexibility. Underutilization of debt persists even when firms exercise their last investment options, and it is more (less) severe for more back-loaded (front-loaded) investment opportunities. Thus, leverage dynamics cruciall...
متن کاملCorporate Access to External Financing
Access to external finance, such as bank loans or trade credit, is a key determinant of a firm’s ability to develop, operate, and expand. Economic researchers have studied how various macroeconomic and microeconomic factors influence such access; for example, it has been shown to depend on the macroeconomic environment, since economic downturns tend to limit firms’ ability to borrow and banks’ ...
متن کاملPolitical Relationships, Global Financing and Corporate Transparency
This study examines the financing choices of firms operating in a weak institutional environment. We argue that in relationship-based systems, global financing and strong political connections are alternative means to create firm value. Well-connected firms might be less inclined to access global capital markets because (state-owned) domestic banks provide capital at low cost. Moreover, the exp...
متن کاملBank financing and corporate governance ¬リニ
Available online 18 October 2014 Extant literature suggests that bank monitoring improves corporate governance. This paper demonstrates that inefficiency in banking can also significantly reduce the equity capital markets' disciplinary power. Specifically, we show that in an environment in which the banking system is dominated by inefficient state-owned banks, controlling shareholders' tunnelin...
متن کاملCorporate Governance and Financing Policy: New Evidence
Prior research has documented evidence that entrenched managers tend to avoid debt. Contrary to this evidence, I find that firms with weak shareholder rights, as measured by the Gompers et al. (2003) governance index, actually use more debt finance and have higher leverage ratios. I provide an explanation by showing that entrenched managers choose conservative (safe) investment policies and the...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Finance: Theory and Practice
سال: 2017
ISSN: 2587-5671
DOI: 10.26794/2587-5671-2017-21-5-22-29