Modern Scepticism, Metaphysics, and Absolute Knowing in Hegel's <i>Science of Logic</i>

Abstract While there are good reasons to think that Hegel would not engage with modern scepticism in the Science of Logic , this article argues he nevertheless does so a way informs text's conception logic as latter pertains metaphysics. engages scepticism's general concerns philosophy should begin without unexamined presuppositions and come attain only knowledge truth, but corresponding second-order knowledge: knowing truth. These inform two needs formulates for first philosophy, which logic—by unifying metaphysics, is traditionally synonymous philosophy—is satisfy. However, logic, unified metaphysics science absolute knowing, form thinking involved traditional As such, neither anti-metaphysical nor reducible rather metaphysical thinking, which, Hegel, includes The emphasizes how Hegel's construal avoids running into ‘swimming problem’ raises against, broadly, epistemological forms philosophy.