Monitoring, Corporate Performance and Institutional Directors

Directors' Incentives and Corporate Performance

We examine the effect of the incentives of the members of the board of directors on shareholder wealth, CEO compensation and the sensitivity of this compensation to corporate performance in laboratory setting. Two methods of appointing the board, one by the CEO and the other by the largest shareholder, constitute the main treatment. The board sets the compensation for the CEO, who makes product...

Corporate Governance , Board of Directors , and Firm Performance

Outside Directors and Firm Performance during Institutional Transitions

Do outside directors on corporate boards make a difference in firm performance during institutional transitions? What leads to the practice of appointing outside directors in the absence of legal mandate? This article addresses these two important questions by drawing not only on agency theory, but also resource dependence and institutional theories. Taking advantage of China’s institutional tr...

Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance and the Performance of the Corporate Sector

Proportions of equity held by institutional investors are rising across all OECD countries. Paradigms of corporate governance involving a key role for institutions are market control via equity (the takeover sanction), market control via debt (LBOs) and direct control via equity (corporate governance activism). Even in countries where institutions are currently unimportant to corporate governan...

Corporate Governance When Founders Are Directors

We examine the role of founders as directors by examining executive compensation, CEO retention policies, and M&A decisions in firms where founders serve as a director with a nonfounder CEO (founder-director). We find that founder-director firms offer a different mix of incentives to their CEO than other firms. Pay for performance sensitivity for non-founder CEOs in founder-director firms is al...