Monopoly Insurance with Endogenous Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Endogenous Monopoly Market Segmentation
The standard monopoly pricing problem is re-considered when the buyer’s type (e.g. age, income, experience) can be credibly disclosed at some cost. In the optimal sales mechanism with costly disclosure, the seller posts a “sticker price” available to any buyer, as well as a schedule of discounts available to those who disclose certain types. Unambiguous welfare implications are available in the...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2363506