Monotonic core solutions: beyond Young’s theorem
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Monotonic core solutions: beyond Young's theorem
We introduce two new monotonicity properties for core concepts: singlevalued solution concepts that always select a core allocation whenever the game is balanced (has a nonempty core). We present one result of impossibility for one of the properties and we pose several open questions for the second property. The open questions arise because the most important core concepts (the nucleolus and th...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-013-0368-8