Moorean Arguments and Moral Revisionism
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Moorean Moral Phenomenology
Inquiry into the what-it-is-likeness of concrete moral experience—moral phenomenology—has not generally been part of moral philosophy as practiced in the analytic tradition at least since G. E. Moore’s 1903 Principia Ethica.1 Although there FN:1 have been a few exceptions—including, most notably, Maurice Mandelbaum’s 1955 The Phenomenology of Moral Experience—and although analytic philosophers ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
سال: 2017
ISSN: 1559-3061
DOI: 10.26556/jesp.v3i2.31