Moore's Paradox, Defective Interpretation, Justified Belief and Conscious Belief
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Moore ’ s Paradox , Defective Interpretation , Justified Belief and Conscious Belieftheo
In this journal, Hamid Vahid argues against three families of explanation of Mooreparadoxicality. The first is the Wittgensteinian approach; I assert that p just in case I assert that I believe that p. So making a Moore-paradoxical assertion involves contradictory assertions. The second is the epistemic approach, one committed to: if I am justified in believing that p then I am justified in bel...
متن کاملJustified Belief as Responsible Belief
In what follows, I will be making recommendations for how to understand and distinguish these three concepts. The account I will be developing situates the concept of epistemically rational belief into a well-integrated and philosophically respectable general theory of rationality; it links the concept of warranted belief with the theory of knowledge; and it insists that the concept of justifie...
متن کاملJustified Belief and Rationality
Brandenburger and Dekel have shown that common belief of rationality (CBR) characterizes rationalizable strategies, which are also characterized by a refinement of subjective correlated equilibrium called a posteriori equilibrium. It is possible that players’ beliefs might be incompatible, in the sense that player i can assign probability 1 to an event E to which player j assigns probability 0....
متن کاملGettier and Justified True Belief
This report will be divided into three sections. The first will contain a description of the idea of knowledge as justified true belief (JBT) and the Gettier and Gettier-style objections to it. The second will describe a number of attempts to fix the Gettier problem from a variety of angles, and the third will briefly address the broader question of why this subject has proven so seemingly intr...
متن کاملConscious Belief
█ Abstract Tim Crane maintains that beliefs cannot be conscious because they persist in the absence of consciousness. Conscious judgments can share their contents with beliefs, and their occurrence can be evidence for what one believes; but they cannot be beliefs, because they don’t persist. I challenge Crane’s premise that belief attributions to the temporarily unconscious are literally true. ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoria
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0040-5825
DOI: 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2010.01073.x