Moral Disagreement and Epistemic Advantages

Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement [version of June, 2007]

I begin with some familiar conceptions of epistemic relativism. One kind of epistemic relativism is descriptive pluralism. This is the simple, non-normative thesis that many different communities, cultures, social networks, etc. endorse different epistemic systems (E-systems), i.e., different sets of norms, standards, or principles for forming beliefs and other doxastic states. Communities try ...

Moral and Epistemic Ambiguity in Oedipus Rex

This paper challenges the accepted interpretation of Oedipus Rex, which takes Oedipus’ ignorance of the relevant facts to be an established matter. I argue that Oedipus’ epistemic state is ambiguous, and that this in turn generates a moral ambiguity with respect to his actions. Because ignorance serves as a moral excuse, my demonstration that Oedipus was not ignorant bears significantly on the ...

Moral and Epistemic Open-question Arguments

As advertised in its subtitle, Terence Cuneo’s rich new book, The Normative Web, puts forth an argument for moral realism. Moral realism, Cuneo argues, is on a par with epistemic realism—roughly, the view that there are genuine epistemic facts, facts such as that it is reasonable to believe that astrology is false. These two realist doctrines stand or fall together. But epistemic realism is tru...

Moral realism and the sceptical arguments from disagreement and queerness

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Dealing With Disagreement: Distinguishing Two Types of Epistemic Peers