Moral Hazard, Financial Constraints and Sharecropping in El Oulja
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Review of Economic Studies
سال: 1995
ISSN: 0034-6527
DOI: 10.2307/2298034