Multi-lateral strategic bargaining without stationarity

Bargaining Under Strategic Uncertainty

This paper provides a novel understanding of delays in reaching agreements based on the idea of strategic uncertainty—i.e., the idea that a Bargainer may face uncertainty about her opponent’s play, even if there is no uncertainty about the structure of the game. It considers a particular form of strategic uncertainty, called on path strategic certainty. On path strategic certainty is the assump...

Strategic Delay in Networked Bargaining

We study decentralized markets involving producers and consumers that are facilitated by middlemen. We do this by analyzing a non-cooperative networked bargaining game. We assume a complete information set-up wherein all the agents know the structure of the network, the values of the consumers and the transaction costs involved but allow for some search friction when either producers or consume...

Cramton Strategic Delay in Bargaining

The role of strategic delay is analyzed in an infinite-horizon alternating-offer model of bargaining. A buyer and seller are engaged in the trade of a single object. Both bargainers have private information about their own preferences and are impatient in that delaying agreement is costly. An equilibrium is constructed in which the bargainers signal the strength of their bargaining positions by...

Bargaining Theory without Tears

Bargaining without Commitment *

A fundamental assumption in all sequential bargaining models is that when an offer is accepted the bargaining terminates with the implementation of that proposal. The proposer cannot change his mind; he is, in effect, committed to his proposal. In this short paper we explore the consequence of relaxing this (rather strong) commitment assumption. Our main result indicates that this commitment as...