منابع مشابه
Pandering and electoral competition
We study an election with two perfectly informed candidates. Voters share common values over the policy outcome of the election, but possess arbitrarily little information about which policy is best for them. Voters elect one of the candidates, effectively choosing between the two policies proposed by the candidates. We explore under which conditions candidates always propose the voters’ optima...
متن کاملRepeated Downsian electoral competition
We analyze an infinitely repeated version of the Downsian model of elections. The folk theorem suggests that a wide range of policy paths can be supported by subgame perfect equilibria when parties and voters are sufficiently patient. We go beyond this result by giving separate weak conditions on the patience of voters and the patience of parties under which every policy path can be supported. ...
متن کاملA Drawback of Electoral Competition
In most major democracies there are very few parties compared to the number of possible policy positions held by voters. We provide an e¢ ciency rationale for why it might be appropriate to limit the proliferation of parties. In our model, the larger the number of parties, the greater the ine¢ ciency of Acknowledgments: We would like to thank two anonymous referees and Xavier Vives for helpful ...
متن کاملThe Drawbacks of Electoral Competition
We examine the effect of the number of candidates and the impact of ideology on the efficiency of the electoral process. We show that the tendency to focus on policies that provide particularistic benefits increases with the number of candidates to the expense of policies that benefit the population at large. Thus, the efficiency of policies provided in an electoral equilibrium worsens when the...
متن کاملPolicy Persuasion and Electoral Competition
The paper studies the impact of biased media news on policy outcomes in the classical Hotelling-Downs setup of winner-take-all elections with state-dependent payoffs. When voters and the two parties do not observe this state but an ideologically biased media does, it can indulge in two forms of cheap talk messaging: policy advice (that comes before parties commit to platforms) and party endorse...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Urban and Regional Studies
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0969-7764,1461-7145
DOI: 10.1177/09697764030103005