Multi-Market Collusion with Demand Linkages and Antitrust Enforcement
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Multi-Market Collusion with Demand Linkages and Antitrust Enforcement
This paper analyzes dynamic cartel formation and antitrust enforcement when firms operate in demand-related markets. We show that cartel prosecution can have a knock-on effect: desisting a cartel in one market reduces profits and cartel stability and leads to the break-up of the cartel in the adjacent market. Cartel prosecution can also have a waterbed effect: desisting a cartel increases carte...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Journal of Industrial Economics
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0022-1821
DOI: 10.1111/joie.12041