Multi-Object Auctions with Resale: An Experimental Analysis
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Asymmetric Auctions with Resale: An Experimental Study
We present results from an experiment based on Hafalir and Krishna’s (2008) model of auctions with resale. As predicted weak bidders bid more with resale than without and resale raises average auction prices. When the equilibrium calls for weak types to bid higher than their values with resale they do so, but not nearly as much as the theory predicts. When the equilibrium calls for weak bidders...
متن کاملEnglish auctions with resale: An experimental study
I design and test a simple English auction and two English auctions with resale, but with different informational backgrounds. All three treatments theoretically have the same equilibrium. I find, however, that the possibility of resale alters behavior significantly. In the two treatments with resale, subjects deviated from both the Nash prediction and the common results about bidding behavior ...
متن کاملAsymmetric auctions with resale: An experimental study
We present results from an experiment based on Hafalir and Krishnas (2008) model of auctions with resale. As predicted weak bidders bid more with resale than without, so that resale raises average auction prices. When the equilibrium calls for weak types to bid higher than their values with resale they do, but not nearly as much as the theory predicts. When the equilibrium calls for weak bidde...
متن کاملMulti-object auctions with resale: Theory and experiment
We study multi-object auctions in the presence of post-auction trade opportunities among bidders who have either singleor multi-object demand. We focus on two formats: Vickrey auctions where package bidding is possible and simultaneous second-price auctions. We show that, under complementarities, the Vickrey format has an equilibrium where the objects are allocated efficiently at the auction st...
متن کاملAuctions with entry and resale
We study how resale affects auctions with costly entry in a model where bidders possess twodimensional private information signals: entry costs and valuations. We establish the existence of symmetric entry equilibrium and identify sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium is unique. Our analysis suggests that the opportunity of resale affects both entry and bidding, and, in particular, ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2198306