Multi-profile intergenerational social choice
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Multi-profile intergenerational social choice
In an infinite-horizon setting, Ferejohn and Page showed that Arrow’s axioms and stationarity lead to a dictatorship by the first generation. Packel strengthened this result by proving that no collective choice rule generating complete social preferences can satisfy unlimited domain, weak Pareto and stationarity. We prove that a domain restriction can be imposed and completeness can be dropped ...
متن کاملTitle Multi - Profile Intergenerational Social Choice
In an infinite-horizon setting, Ferejohn and Page showed that Arrow’s axioms and stationarity lead to a dictatorship by the first generation. Packel strengthened this result by proving that no collective choice rule generating complete social preferences can satisfy unlimited domain, weak Pareto and stationarity. We prove that a domain restriction can be imposed and completeness can be dropped ...
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We provide a brief survey of some literature on intertemporal social choice theory in a multi-profile setting. As is well-known, Arrow’s impossibility result hinges on the assumption that the population is finite. For infinite populations, there exist nondictatorial social welfare functions satisfying Arrow’s axioms and they can be described by their corresponding collections of decisive coalit...
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The SCLP (Social Choice Logic Programming) approach aims to model the axioms of collective decision making and to prove the classical results on preference aggregation computationally, such as Arrow’s social welfare function and its variants, by using PROLOG, albeit for the smallest case. This paper aims to extend and improve the SCLP approach in two directions. First, the Cube-First Method (CF...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-010-0501-6