Multi-sided Pre-play Communication by Burning Money
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Pre-play Communication in Games of Two-Sided Incomplete Information
Communication, even cheap talk in a pre-play stage, is commonly viewed as important for inducing information revelation, coordination, and efficient outcomes. Yet, many current results are based on two assumptions that seem to be inconsistent with many interesting empirical situations: that only one player is privately informed and that actors have no constraints limiting their actions. We reme...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 1996
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.0043