Multi-Unit Auctions for Allocating Chance-Constrained Resources
نویسندگان
چکیده
Sharing scarce resources is a key challenge in multi-agent interaction, especially when individual agents are uncertain about their future consumption. We present new auction mechanism for preallocating multi-unit among agents, while limiting the chance of resource violations. By planning constraint, we strike balance between worst-case approaches, which under-utilise resources, and expected-case lack formal guarantees. also an algorithm that allows to generate bids via multi-objective reasoning, then submitted auction. discuss how can be extended non-cooperative scenarios. Finally, demonstrate empirically our outperforms state-of-the-art techniques chance-constrained allocation complex settings with up hundreds agents.
منابع مشابه
Allocating Resources to Wealth-Constrained Agents∗
Governments have a profound impact on the allocation of many goods, services and rights. We study individuals who differ in their valuations and in their wealth. In particular, some individuals have binding wealth constraints, which inhibit voluntary exchange, so the initial assignment scheme matters. We show that non-market assignment schemes — even as simple as random rationing — may yield a ...
متن کاملSOME PROPERTIES FOR FUZZY CHANCE CONSTRAINED PROGRAMMING
Convexity theory and duality theory are important issues in math- ematical programming. Within the framework of credibility theory, this paper rst introduces the concept of convex fuzzy variables and some basic criteria. Furthermore, a convexity theorem for fuzzy chance constrained programming is proved by adding some convexity conditions on the objective and constraint functions. Finally,...
متن کاملMulti-Unit Auctions
We survey experimental research on multi-unit auctions with an emphasis on topics that may be of a unifying interest to experimental, as well as theoretical and empirical economists. Topics include static and dynamic multi-unit auctions; combinatorial auctions and efficient auction design; simultaneous and sequential auctions; bidder asymmetry and endogenous entry, and collusion in auctions. We...
متن کاملEfficient Methods for Multi-agent Multi-issue Negotiation: Allocating Resources
In this paper, we present an automated multi-agent multi-issue negotiation solution to solve a resource allocation problem. We use a multilateral negotiation model, by which three agents bid sequentially in consecutive rounds till some deadline. Two issues are bundled and negotiated concurrently, so winwin opportunities can be generated as trade-offs exist between issues. We develop negotiation...
متن کاملEfficient Multi-unit Auctions for Normal Goods
I study efficient multi-unit auction design when bidders have private values, multiunit demands, and non-quasilinear preferences. Without quasilinearity, the Vickrey auction loses its desired incentive and efficiency properties. Instead of assuming that bidders have quasilinear preferences, I assume that bidders have positive wealth effects. This nests cases where bidders are risk averse, face ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Proceedings of the ... AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['2159-5399', '2374-3468']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v37i10.26366